Institutional Foundations for Cyber Security: Current Responses and New Challenges by Choucri, Nazli et al.
ESD Working Paper Series
ESD-WP-2014-33 November 2014
Institutional Foundations for Cyber Security: Current
Responses and New Challenges
Nazli Choucri
Professor of Political Science 
MIT Department of Political Science
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Email: nchoucrimit.edu
Stuart Madnick
John Norris Maguire Professor of
Information Technology and Professor 
of Engineering Systems
MIT Sloan School of Management and 
MIT School of Engineering
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Email: smadnickmit.edu 
Jeremy Ferwerda
Graduate Research Assistant
MIT Department of Political Science
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Email: ferwerdamit.edu
esd.mit.edu/wps
  
 
Institutional Foundations for Cyber Security:  
Current Responses and New Challenges 
 
Nazli Choucri, Stuart Madnick, Jeremy Ferwerda 
 
 
 
Working Paper CISL# 2013-16 
 
October 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Composite Information Systems Laboratory (CISL) 
Sloan School of Management, Room E62-422 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Cambridge, MA 02142 
Institutions for Cyber Security: International Responses and Global
Imperatives
Nazli Choucria, Stuart Madnickb
∗
and Jeremy Ferwerdaa
aDepartment of Political Science, MIT, Cambridge, MA, USA; bSloan School of Management,
MIT, 30 Wadsworth Street, Room E53-321, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA
Almost everyone recognizes the salience of cyberspace as a fact of daily life. Given its
ubiquity, scale, and scope, cyberspace has become a fundamental feature of the world we
live in and has created a new reality for almost everyone in the developed world and
increasingly for people in the developing world. This paper seeks to provide an initial
baseline, for representing and tracking institutional responses to a rapidly changing
international landscape, real as well as virtual. We shall argue that the current institutional
landscape managing security issues in the cyber domain has developed in major ways, but
that it is still “under construction.” We also expect institutions for cyber security to support
and reinforce the contributions of information technology to the development process. We
begin with (a) highlights of international institutional theory and an empirical “census” of
the institutions-in-place for cyber security, and then turn to (b) key imperatives of
information technology-development linkages and the various cyber processes that enhance
developmental processes, (c) major institutional responses to cyber threats and cyber crime
as well as select international and national policy postures so critical for industrial
countries and increasingly for developing states as well, and (d) the salience of new
mechanisms designed specifically in response to cyber threats.
Keywords: cyber security; cyber governance; cyber institutions; sustainable development;
CERTs; information technology
1. Introduction
The expansion of cyberspace has occurred at a dramatic pace over the past two decades. Almost
every location on the globe now has some degree of cyber access, outpacing even the most opti-
mistic expectations of the early architects of the Internet. Less anticipated, however, by the
initial innovators or anyone else, was the subsequent introduction of cyber threats and the
accompanying innovations in the disruption and distortion of cyber venues.
This paper is positioned at the intersection of the long tradition of international institutions
and the nascent area of theorizing about cyberpolitics in international relations. Its purpose is to
provide an initial baseline, for representing and tracking institutional responses to a rapidly chan-
ging international landscape, real as well as virtual. In this paper, we shall argue that the current
institutional landscape managing security issues in the cyber domain has developed in major
ways, but that it is still “under construction.” We also anticipate that institutions for cyber secur-
ity will support and reinforce the contributions of information technology to the development
process.
For purposes of context and background, we (a) begin with highlights of international insti-
tutional theory and an empirical “census” of the institutions-in-place for cyber security, and then
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turn to (b) key imperatives of information technology-development linkages and the various
cyber processes that enhance developmental processes, (c) major institutional responses to
cyber threats and cyber crime as well as select international and national policy postures so criti-
cal for industrial countries and increasingly for developing states as well, and (d) the salience of
new mechanisms designed specifically in response to cyber threats.
2. International institutions: theoretical anchors and empirical record
Over the better part of a decade, the convergence of four distinct but interconnected trends in
international relations created demands for formal interventions involving governments and
international coordination. First, Internet usage continued to rise, coupled with an expansion
in forms of use. Second, many governments recognized that cyber vulnerabilities continued
to threaten not only the security of their own networks, but also those of their citizens involved
in routine activities on a daily basis. Third, a noted absence of coordinated industry response or
of efforts to develop cooperative threat reduction strategies, reinforced an unambiguous gap-in-
governance. Finally, a growing set of cyber incidents, large and small, signaled to governments
the potential impact of their failure to address the emerging threats. In response to these trends,
governments, in various ways, mobilized significant national and international resources toward
the creation of a broad cyber security framework.
2.1 Theoretical context
There is a long, respected, and distinguished tradition of institution-centric scholarship in
modern international relations. The classical literature in this field focused on the United
Nations (UN) and its institutions against a background of the failures of the League of
Nations;1 this literature was largely descriptive, highlighting structure and function.2 With the
evolution of European integration, institutionalism took a new turn, seeking to connect domestic
and international politics and to signal potentials for diffusion of institutional development.3
Subsequently, the conceptual frame of reference shifted to focus on “demand” and “supply”
driving the development of international institutions.4
Subsequently, the concept of regime emerged as an important anchor in the field. In this
paper, however, we focus on the formal aspects of regimes, namely the institutional manifes-
tations, rather than on underlying norms and principles. In a review of institutionalism theory,
Hall and Taylor (1996) argue that contemporary institutionalism, known as “new institutional-
ism,” is actually an amalgam of three types of theoretical considerations rather than one single
theory – namely historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological
institutionalism. The first focuses largely on constitutional issues, bureaucratic arrangements,
and operating procedures of interaction. The second, rational choice institutionalism, centers
on the value of reduced transaction costs, the relationship between principals and agents, and
strategic interaction – all based on the underlying logic of rational choice. Sociological institu-
tionalism, the third variant, concentrates largely on why organizations adopt particular sets of
institutional forms, including procedures and symbols.
A somewhat different perspective on institutional issues in the context of the sovereign state,
put forth by Reich (2000), argues that the relevant institutional features or theoretical perspec-
tives should be viewed in the context of the specific case in question. This view is based on Lowi
(1964), who argued that the policy domains, or subject matter, dictate the “best” institutional
forms – thus placing the empirical context in the forefront and matters of theory in a derivative
position. This pragmatic perspective fits well with the policy imperatives created by the cyber
domain.
2 N. Choucri et al.
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While the literature tends to argue that consensus on norms precedes the formation of insti-
tution, we suspect that in the cyber domain the reverse dynamics hold, namely that institutions
may well be the precursors for formalizing norms and principles that, in turn, might consolidate
and strengthen the institutions themselves. This contingency is especially likely in the develop-
ment context.
2.2 Institutional “ecosystem”: a baseline
Building a “baseline” for cyber security institutions in international relations is particularly
daunting given the trajectory of evolution for the cyber domain.
To begin with, cyberspace was constructed by the private sector – albeit with the support and
direction of the dominant power in world politics, the USA. The state system formally defined in
cyberspace is a relatively recent development; the entire cyber domain is managed by non-state
entities, an important aspect of scale and scope in international relations.
Second, the usual mechanisms for tracking activities in the physical world – statistics, stan-
dards, measurements, etc. – are not automatically conducive to “virtual” traces or counterparts.
Third, the very nature of the “virtual” contradicts that which is physical. Threats in the
“virtual” domain are often identified after the fact, rather than tracked “in process.” In the
cyber domain, there is not only no early warning system, there are as yet few early signals of
a cyber threat, if any.
The broad institutional domain presented in Table 1 provides a baseline view of the cyber
security “institutional ecosystem” which is a complex assortment of national, international,
and private organizations. Parallel to the organic fashion in which cyberspace itself developed,
these organizations often have unclear mandates or possess overlapping spheres of influence.
Our purpose here is only to highlight these major entities and, to the extent possible, to signal
their relationships and interconnections, compiling something of a census of institutions. A sec-
ondary, but also important, objective is to explore data quality and the extent to which we may
infer organizational performance from public metrics, creating a performance assessment of
sorts.
While we catalogue many of the major institutional players in this aspect of cyber security,
we do not claim to provide an exhaustive “census.” We used two criteria for the selection of
institutions, namely (a) data provision of public qualitative or quantitative data in each of our
areas of focus (international, intergovernmental, national, non-profit, and private sector) and
(b) coordination responsibility based on formal mandates issued by recognized international
or national bodies. For the national sphere, we focused on the USA as a representative model
but also included several examples of non-US national entities; detailed analysis of other
national efforts is beyond the scope of this paper.
3. Information technology and development linkages
The academic as well as the policy communities worldwide have long focused on challenges
associated with economic, social, and political development, broadly defined. Throughout the
entire immediate World War II period, the decolonization process created a whole new “gener-
ation” of governments whose vision of governance required adaptation to the new challenges,
and whose limited capability required immediate enhancement if any possibility of effective per-
formance is to be realized.
The development agenda of the international community recognized the complexity of the
foregoing, and over time the requisite institutional mechanisms were put in place. Some were
Information Technology for Development 3
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Table 1. International institutional ecosystem.
Institution Role
Data
availability
Example variables (if
applicable)
CERTs
AP-CERT Asian regional coordination High Collation of security metrics
from member CERTs in
Asia
CERT/CC Coordination of global CERTs,
especially national CERTs.
Moderate Vulnerabilities catalogued,
hotline calls received,
advisories and alerts
published, incidents
handled
FIRST Forum and information sharing
for CERTs
Low Secondary data from
conferences and presented
papers
National CERTS (e.g.
US-CERT)
National coordination;
national defense and
response
High Varies – volume of malicious
code and viruses,
vulnerability alerts,
botnets, incident reports
TF-CSIRT: Computer
Security Incident
Response Teams
European regional
coordination
N/A N/A
International entities
CCDCOE Enhancing NATO’s cyber
defense capability
N/A N/A
Council of Europe International legislation Moderate Legislation and ratification
statistics; secondary data
from conferences and
presented papers.
EU: European Union Sponsors working parties,
action plans, guidelines
N/A N/A
ENISA Awareness-raising,
cooperation between the
public and private sectors,
advising the EU on cyber
security issues, data
collection
Low Awareness-raising stats, spam
surveys, regional surveys,
country reports. Qualitative
data assessing the EU cyber
security sphere
G8: Subgroup on High-
Tech Crime
Sponsored 24/7 INTERPOL
hotline, various policy
guidelines
N/A N/A
IMPACT Global threat response center,
data analysis, real-time early
warning system
N/Aa N/Aa
INTERPOL Manages 24/7 hotline, trains
law enforcement agencies,
participates in investigations
N/A N/A
ITU Sponsors IMPACT. Organizes
conferences, releases
guidelines and toolkits,
facilitates information
exchange and cooperation
Moderate Internet usage and penetration
statistics; secondary data
from conferences and
presented papers
NATO Responding to military attacks
on NATO member states
N/A N/A: classified
(Continued)
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Table 1. Continued.
Institution Role
Data
availability
Example variables (if
applicable)
OECD Develops policy options,
organizes conferences,
publishes guidelines and
best practices
Low Secondary data from
conferences and presented
papers
UNODC: United Nations
Office on Drugs &
Crime
Promotion of legislation,
training programs,
awareness, enforcement
N/A N/A
WSIS Global summit on information
security; publishes
resolutions and monitors
implementation through
stock-taking efforts
Low Stock-taking database and
secondary data from
conferences and presented
papers
US national entities
NSA: National Security
Agency
Shares Director, General Keith
Alexander, with US
CYBERCOM; specializes in
cryptology services and
research
N/A N/A
CIA: Central Intelligence
Agency
Defense of intelligence
networks, information
gathering
N/A N/A: Classified
DHS Protection of federal civil
networks and critical
infrastructure; information
sharing and awareness;
coordinating federal
response and alerts
N/A N/A: Unclassified data
released through US-CERT
DoD: Department of
Defense
Defense of military networks,
counterattack capability
N/A N/A: Classified
DOJ: US Department of
Justice
Federal prosecution Moderate Non aggregated data:
prosecuted cases, crime by
industry
FBI Federal investigation Low Total reported incidents,
number of referrals to law
enforcement agencies.
Annual surveys on
corporate computer crime
including type and
frequency of attacks, dollar
loss, attack source
FTC Consumer protection N/A N/A
IC3 Cybercrime reporting and
referral center
High Total complaints, referred
complaints, estimated
dollar loss, complaints by
industrial sector
NW3C: National White
Collar Crime Center
Provides training and support
to law enforcement
agencies, helps administer
the IC3 with the FBI
N/A N/A: statistics released
through IC3
(Continued)
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Table 1. Continued.
Institution Role
Data
availability
Example variables (if
applicable)
FSSCC: Financial
Services Sector
Coordinating Council
By DHS mandate, identifies
threats and promotes
protection to protect
financial sector critical
infrastructure assets
N/A N/A
Secret service Investigation of economic
cyber crimes
N/A N/A
US-CERT Defense of federal civil
networks (.gov),
information sharing and
collaboration with private
sector.
Moderate Incidents and events by
category, vulnerability
reports
Non-US national entities (frequent collaborative partners)
GCHQ: Government
Communications
Headquarters (UK)
One of three of Britain’s
intelligence agencies
responsible for information
assurance and cryptology;
Britain’s leading authority
on cyber security
N/A N/A
National Cyberdefence
Centre (Germany)
Recently opened (16 June)
agency for cyber security in
Germany; responds to
reports of cyber attacks on
critical infrastructure
N/A N/A
National Police Bureaus
(e.g. Taiwan, South
Korea, Japan, France)
Investigation, enforcement Varies Cases, arrests, prosecutions,
demographics
Non-profits
GICSR: Global Institute
for Security and
Research
Conducts R&D with industry
leaders, public–private
sector, and academia to
develop policy and strategy
for cyberspace
N/A N/A
Internet society Non-technical branch of
Internet Engineering Task
Force; provides leadership
in addressing policy issues
that confront the future of
the Internet
N/A N/A
CyberWatch Develops educational
programs and curriculum to
train next generation of
cyber security experts
N/A N/A
CAIDA: Cooperative
Association for
Internet Data Analysis
Gathers data that will increase
situational awareness of
Internet topology structure,
behavior, and vulnerabilities
High Graphs and visuals of Internet
traffic patterns
Private sector
MacAfee Industry leader in antivirus
software; computer security
services
Moderate White papers
(Continued)
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appended to the organizations created to manage the aftermath of World War II and others were
created specifically for meeting the development challenges.
3.1 Sustainable development
By 1990, the entire development discourse shifted away from growth per se (i.e. expansion of
output) to sustainable development (a more comprehensive and nuanced process). “Sustainabil-
ity” had become central to our daily concerns as well as to policy and decision in all contexts and
in nearly all parts of the world. Without undue simplification, it is fair to say that the traditional
view of development focused on productivity and the expansion of economic output.
Later on concepts of human development took hold and the well-being of individuals and
society were seen as essential features of development. Sustainable development, first formally
introduced at the United Nations Conference on Environment, 1990, recognized the sanctity of
nature and its life supporting services, thus placing the growth imperative in a broader context.
Agenda 21 framed and reflected an international consensus and a plan of action articulated in
Millennium Development Goals. The view of sustainable development at the time was that of
meeting the needs of present and future generations without undermining the cohesion of the
social system or the life supporting properties of natural system.
During the last decade of the twentieth century, cyberspace was recognized almost univer-
sally as being of great importance. By an accident of chance, by design, or by the logic of tech-
nological development, this human-constructed environment had already assumed near
worldwide scale and scope. Many parts of the world were still unconnected, but everyone recog-
nized it was just a matter of time until the world’s population became interlinked. It was an
unstated assumption that the Internet would simply proliferate.
With the benefit of hindsight, we now appreciate that the assumption was correct, but also
missed almost all of the underlying institutional dynamics, the emerging political contentions,
Table 1. Continued.
Institution Role
Data
availability
Example variables (if
applicable)
PROINFO Products analyze vulnerability
dependencies and shows all
possible attack paths into a
network
N/A N/A
Raytheon Co. Cyber security solutions
division offers wide arrange
of information assurance
services
N/A N/A
Lockheed Martin Defense contractor that
supplies many governmental
cyber security G&S
N/A N/A
Red Tiger Security Investigates cyber attacks N/A N/A
HB Gary Investigates cyber attacks N/A N/A
Versigen iDefense Investigates cyber attacks N/A N/A
International Computer
Security Association
Specializes in antivirus, anti-
spam, and firewall services
among a wide array of other
cyber security services
Moderate Graphs of which countries
sent the most spam per
week
aN/A, not available.
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and the growing efforts of the state and the state system to shape trajectories, rules, and norms of
a cyber system – with the Internet as its core – that had been built as an open domain, shaped by
only the minimal regulatory conventions necessary for effective operation.
Unless proven otherwise, all evidence suggests that never before in modern times has a major
technological innovation exhibited such rapid diffusion throughout the world. Differences in
infrastructure, skills, literacy, and capabilities aside, cyber access in developing countries has
expanded rapidly over the past decades.
During the early days of the Internet the open ethos dominated. With greater understanding
of uses and growth in the diversity of users, networks were no longer secure. A wide range of
malevolent intrusions with varying degrees of damage effects demonstrated without doubt the
vulnerability of the Internet. With this near-certain vulnerability and threat, the very sustainabil-
ity of the human-constructed cyber domain was at stake. Cyber security had now become a
matter of national and, to the extent possible, international priority as well.
3.1.1 Critical convergence of information and development
The process shaping and managing the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS) places
cyberspace at the center of international policy discourse. As a UN-based initiative, decisions
at the WSIS were made at the state level, and only sovereign states served as “decision-
makers.” At the same time, all stakeholders wishing to participate in the overall process –
from agenda setting to various forms and forums of deliberations – were encouraged to do
so. This practice dated back to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
in 1990, a major landmark in the history of international collaboration.
The WSIS intergovernmental initiative is a milestone in its own right as it sought to
combine several distinct aspects of the UN’s twentieth-century development agenda with
emergent implications of information technology. WSIS was the first comprehensive response
to the emergent “virtual” global society in a world increasingly concerned with the dilemmas
of sustainable development. Although it was not conceived as a security-centric activity, the
WSIS objectives that dealt with cyber security were broadly consistent with developmental
concerns.
Operationally, WSIS was organized into two phases, each standing as a global conference in
its own right. The first phase, held in Geneva in 2003, had representatives from over 175
countries committed to a wide-ranging action plan. Action Line C5 focused on “building con-
fidence and security” and committed member countries to increasing security awareness, enact-
ing legislation, and cooperating more extensively with the private sector (WSIS, 2003).
These goals were expanded upon in 2005 at the second phase in Tunis, when member organ-
izations reaffirmed their Geneva commitments and agreed upon a collective stock-taking method
to track action line implementation. The efforts by member states to implement Action Line C5
are viewable in a public database and are also published in annual reports (WSIS, 2009a). The
combined conclusions transformed the general consensus into a Plan of Action. The Plan cen-
tered around information society in the developing world. This is the point of convergence
between information and development.
At the WSIS meeting in Paris, 2013, we put forth the proposition that the overarching con-
ditions for sustainability and for the process of sustainable development broadly defined rest
not only on the sustainability of the social and the natural system, but also on the sustainabil-
ity of the cyber system. In other words, sustainable development is contingent on the sustain-
ability of all three systems – social, environmental, and cyber (Choucri, 2012). In other
words, this proposition recognizes that humans are now embedded in three interconnected
systems.
8 N. Choucri et al.
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3.2 The new security calculus
Traditionally, national security focuses on security at the state borders and protection against
military or other threatening intrusions. Over time this simple doctrine was refined into a
more comprehensive view of security. In addition, the near universal expansion of government
responsibility, the conception of a stable state, or alternatively, a failing one became closely tied
to the evolving developmental agenda.
To simplify, security and sustainability gradually converged into one general vision of
imperatives for survival, a vision that included border protection, social viability, and govern-
ment capability. In its execution, defense was clearly the responsibility of the military. Social
viability included, by emergent definitions, meeting the needs of present and future generations
and the protection of nature’s life supporting properties.
The construction of cyberspace created a new set of imperatives and an entirely new set of
threats to security for the state system and all non-state entities – for profit and not for profit. No
one could foresee the scale, scope, and damage potentials. Most important of all, the anonymity
of the perpetrator created an unprecedented threat to both the traditional view of security,
(defense of borders) and the revised view (military security, security of society and environment,
and security of governance). Thus cyber security became a critical feature of overarching secur-
ity, for industrial and developing states. It had to be managed at all levels of international
relations – national, transnational, international, and global.
4. Computer Emergency Response Teams
New institutions were created specifically in response to cyber threats. These new institutions
were created under national authority, with international scope, but not intergovernmental in
form. Named Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs),5 these are the only worldwide
institutions created specifically in response to the new cyber threats. CERTs are an important
addition to the dense network of international entities in the “real” or physical arena and
occupy a salient role in the cyber security landscape.
As defined by the CERT Coordination Center (CERT/CC) – addressed later on – these enti-
ties focus on security emergencies, promote the use of valid security technology, and ensure
network continuity (CERT Program, 2009a). In principle, this means that CERTs concentrate
on identifying vulnerabilities and fostering communication between security vendors, users,
and private organizations. Although the majority of CERTs were founded as non-profit organ-
izations, many have transitioned toward public–private partnerships in recent years.
This type of lateral institutional design anchored in national governments attempts to build
upon the successes of non-profit CERTs by providing a level of structure and resources hitherto
unavailable. However, while the CERT network is becoming increasingly formalized, individual
CERTs may differ considerably in their ability to effectively perform their mandates. By 2009,
there were over 200 recognized CERTs, with widely different levels of organization, funding,
and expertise (Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams [FIRST], 2009a).
At least three results are expected from CERT activities and interactions: a reduction in
unaddressed security vulnerabilities, improved understanding of the nature and frequency of
cyber threats, and enhanced communicating and reporting of incidents to other security teams
and the general public. Although CERTs are not established to serve as information gathering
institutions per se, their activities involve active threat monitoring and information exchange.
As a result, many CERTs attempt to provide quantitative data for the cyber security community.
To date, however, there is little effort to align or coordinate methods of data collection, and
availability and reliability of reported information thus varies widely across the CERT
Information Technology for Development 9
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landscape. This means that the focus on organization has not yet extended to matters of perform-
ance and coordination.
4.1 Organizational structure
In general, CERTs share a common structure and backbone. In principle, this should help coordi-
nation. The majority of CERTs are organized according to guidelines originally published by
CERT/CC, and many use common toolkits to establish their organizations (Killcrece, 2004).
As a result, CERTs tend to differ from each other mainly in their area of focus (academic,
private, national, and regional), or their respective area of expertise (phishing, viruses, and infor-
mation security). These roles are largely self-defined based on each team’s level of funding
(which can vary widely), technical expertise, and the presence of perceived gaps within the
CERT collaborative network. This means that the principle of autonomy supersedes that of
collaboration.
The flexibility of this system greatly improves the possibility of coordination between
CERTs; however, the loose network structure reduces the locus of responsibility or accountabil-
ity for individual performance. In traditional institutional theory, the underlying generic objec-
tives are to facilitate collective action, reduce transaction costs, and enable the performance of
functions or the provision of services. To illustrate the complexity of arrangements, Figure 1 pre-
sents a subset of these structured relationships at different levels of analysis and organization.
Figure 1. International CERTs.
10 N. Choucri et al.
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4.2 Coordinating organizations
A distinguishing feature of the CERT system is its coordinating mechanism, CERT/CC, estab-
lished at Carnegie Mellon University in 1998 – in response to a major Internet worm. CERT/CC
was also the first operational CERT, and defined many functional parameters. The US Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency originally provided federal funding for the organization
with the expectation that CERT/CC would serve as a center for direct threat assessment and
response.
As cyberspace and cyber access expanded, a single organization proved insufficient to
handle the increasing volume of security incidents. CERT/CC was forced to reframe its activities
and priorities. Rather than responding directly to emerging incidents, CERT/CC’s renewed
mission utilized the lessons learned to provide guidelines, coordination, and standards for
other CERTs. By relinquishing operational control in favor of a collaborative structure,
CERT/CC laid the foundation for the establishment of regional, focused organizations.
Today, the CERT network has expanded beyond the scope and control of CERT/CC, although
CERT/CC continues to play an influential role in establishing national CERTs in developing
countries and fostering inter-CERT communication.
In addition to CERT/CC, many CERTs also interact with parallel coordination networks,
such as the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST). This body was established
to enhance information sharing between disparate security groups (FIRST, 2009b). Now com-
posed of more than 200 organizations, FIRST is notable for its influential annual conferences
and its extensive integration of national, academic, and private CERTs (FIRST, 2009a). The
establishment of these conferences in itself provides a basis for reinforcing communication
and, as theory would suggest, enhances potentials for coordination.
4.3 National CERTs
The collaborative structure maintained by coordinating agencies such as FIRST and CERT/CC
clearly facilitates information flow among security teams. But there were limitations. If CERTs
were only organized in this fashion, it would be unclear which organizations possessed regional
authority to coordinate the actions of other CERTs, for instance, in the event of a national attack
on civilian networks. This problem was addressed by transitioning the CERT structure to the
national level. One valuable side effect of this shift to national-level jurisdiction was the creation
of public–private partnerships between national CERTs and existing national agencies.
But a solution to one problem can often give rise to additional complications. Given the
diversity of national political systems and bureaucratic practices, the transition to national
CERTs exacerbated the realities of legal and jurisdictional diversity. For example, while
some national CERTs, such as US-CERT, were specifically tasked by their governments to
defend civilian networks, other organizations operate in a legal vacuum and assume national
responsibility via general consensus. Often, this legitimacy is granted by regional organizations
such as Asia Pacific CERT (AP-CERT) in Asia and Task Force Computer Security Incident
Response Teams (TF-CSIRTs) in Europe (Figure 1) that steer regional CERT policy. While
this diversity is not necessarily a problem, it may impede information sharing, and it suggests
that national CERTs may or may not be held to international operating standards.
Although national CERTs are endowed with regional authority, they remain restricted in
their capacity to respond to cyber criminals. National CERTs occupy a first-line responder
role in the event of attacks on national civilian networks, but lack the jurisdictional authority
to shut down criminal networks and prosecute perpetrators. As a result, national CERTs focus
primarily on responding to and preventing technical cyber threats – a necessary requisite for
coordination but not a sufficient one.
Information Technology for Development 11
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In order to effectively deal with legal issues, clear lines of communication between national
CERTs and government agencies are essential. This link has been formalized in some countries,
such as the USA, but other nations are still developing the requisite connections between national
CERTs and legal authority. At the same time, however, current CERT structure also includes ver-
tical linkages – national, regional, and international connections – that are always difficult to
forge but facilitate resilience and robustness of institutional performance over time.
4.4 CERT data provision
At this writing, the level of CERT cooperation and standardization does not extend to the collec-
tion or assessment of quantitative data. As suggested earlier, data availability varies widely
among CERTs, and organizations that publish statistics do not necessarily use similar reporting
methods (Madnick, Li, & Choucri, 2009). Moreover, there are no efforts underway to formally
align and standardize metrics.
Overall, the lack of robust data can be traced to three underlying factors. First, it is inherently
difficult to quantify cyber data due to uncertainties surrounding the nature, geographical
location, and target of attacks. The rapid pace of technological development, coupled with a
lack of standards-providing organizations has thus led to significant disparities in the diagnosis
and classification of cyber events. Second, many CERTs lack a compelling business reason to
gather or verify the accuracy of their quantitative data. CERTs typically possess limited
funding capacity and many organizations choose to allocate their resources to cyber response
in lieu of robust data collection. Lastly, there is no central authority or volunteer organization
tasked with disseminating, collecting, or verifying CERT data. If there is an impediment to
effective data use it is to be found in the domain of motivation – the foundations and the
data are in place, but there appears to be little incentive in taking the next steps to disseminate
gathered data. An initial step in this direction is reported in Madnick, Choucri, et al. (2009).
Although quantitative data are fragmented, the collaborative nature of the CERT network
means that a significant amount of information remains available on CERT activities. From a
research standpoint, CERT/CC and FIRST provide a means to analyze global CERT policy.
In addition, CERT/CC provides a variety of data sources that can be used to evaluate historical
CERT activity. These statistics include the number of security alerts, vulnerability notes, and
advisories published per year. Although these figures are self-reported and the threshold necess-
ary to publish an alert may vary from year to year, they provide a baseline for estimating global
CERT activity. This analysis can be complemented by CERT/CC statistics on the number of
incident reports and hotline calls received from member organizations and national CERTs.6
Useful data can also be gleaned by viewing aggregate data at the regional level. In particular,
AP-CERT and several other regional bodies publish statistics that cover the number of incidents
handled and reported, attack vectors, counts of defaced websites, and other Web vulnerabilities.
While these statistics are not as robust as those provided by the private sector, they are parti-
tioned along national lines and provide country-specific statistics that are valuable for analyzing
divergent responses to cyber threats. By coupling this information with widely available metrics
such as Internet connectivity or arrest rates, and controlling for data quality, it may be possible to
develop a statistical model to analyze the overall effectiveness of cyber defense across nations,
such as that illustrated in Madnick, Choucri, Li, and Ferwerda (2011).
CERTs occupy an important role in the international security ecosystem. But their core com-
petencies or self-defined responsibilities do not extend to consensus building, legislation, or
awareness-raising. This set of functions remained largely unclaimed in the early years of Internet
development, but they have recently been embraced by a variety of intergovernmental
organizations.
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5. Intergovernmental responses
By definition, international organizations consist of sovereign states. All of the major inter-
national organizations and many minor ones were established long before the creation of cyber-
space. They are all major users of cyber venues and often significant data providers as well.
Unlike the CERTs, which are based on collaborative and hierarchical principles, intergovern-
mental organizations are composed of equal actors defined by their status as sovereign entities.
All of these organizations are expected to be driven first and foremost by their own formal man-
dates and priorities. Thus, to the extent that any large international organization considers secur-
ity in cyber venues as relevant to their concerns, it is mostly as a secondary priority. Given the
pervasiveness of cyber venues, however, we expect that these organizations will devote increas-
ing attention to cyber issues in the years to come.
If we focus on organizations that, in principle, have some clear interest or focus on cyber-
space, we can identify the major actors and their zones of activity or interest. Unsurprisingly,
this leads to a diffuse network of organizations and a wide array of cross-cutting linkages. By
way of orientation, we show in Figure 2 several well-known international organizations (such
as the UN) and new cyber-focused entities that do not have the status of “organization” but
are likely to retain a long-standing institutional presence on the international arena (such as
the WSIS).
5.1 Early moves
The involvement of international organizations in cyber security issues can be traced to early
meetings of the G8 Subgroup on Hi-Tech Crime. In 1997, the G8, comprised of the world’s
Figure 2. Key intergovernmental institutions.
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most developed economies, established in cooperation with the International Criminal Police
Organization (INTERPOL) a 24/7 “Network of Contacts” in order to help national governments
“identify the source of terrorist communications, investigate threats and prevent future attacks”
(G8 24/7 High Tech Contact Points, 2009). As part of the program, countries were asked to
cooperate with INTERPOL in international investigations by sharing information on electronic
crimes and by designating an official cybercrime point of contact. While the success rate of the
program remains classified, a similar referral model was later mirrored by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) in the form of Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3), which speaks to its
relative success. As of 2007, 47 countries were actively involved within the network (Verdelho,
2008).
5.2 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-sponsored conferences
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2009a) has been
actively involved in the cyber security domain since 2002. Meeting twice a year in Paris, the
Working Party on Information Security and Privacy (WPISP) has published several influential
white papers, including “Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks”
(2002) and “Promotion of a Culture of Security for Information Systems and Networks”
(2005). These guidelines have been accompanied by stock-taking efforts that track the
implementation of policy in member countries (OECD, 2009b). The WPISP has also released
several surveys on information security policies in member countries and has created a
“Culture of Security” Web portal for member states. Since the WPISP is contained within the
OECD framework, it represents a formalized extension of OECD’s core mission and provides
a common approach for all member states.
For the most part, the foregoing efforts can be seen as “self-initiated,” whereby private or
public entities voluntarily take on a particular function in the emergent cyber security
domain. However, more recently, the international community has issued operational mandates
to specific organizations. Here, we note some of the most dominant initiatives.
5.3 International Telecommunication Union
One of International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU, 2009b) core missions is to standardize
telecommunication technology and release statistics that can be used to track the Internet con-
nectivity of nations. Utilizing a group of high-level experts, ITU provides a variety of resources
and toolkits addressing legislation, awareness, self-assessment, botnets, and CERTs (ITU,
2009a). Additionally, ITU publishes guides that educate developing nations on cybercrime
and promote best practices and approaches.
Although the ITU core competencies are mission-specific, they have recently acted in a
direct fashion by establishing an arm that will provide international threat response. The ITU
was given the primary responsibility for coordinating the implementation of WSIS’ Action
Plan C5 (WSIS, 2009b). In response, the organization launched the “Global Cybersecurity
Agenda” in 2007, working with the International Multilateral Partnership Against Cyber
Threats (IMPACT), headquartered in Malaysia.
Envisioned as a global response center focused on combating cyber terrorism and protecting
critical infrastructure networks, the IMPACT is a public–private venture headquartered in
Malaysia (UNESCO, 2009). Among other services, IMPACT facilitates a real-time warning
network to 191 member countries, 24/7 response centers, and the development of software
that allows security organizations across the globe to pool resources and coordinate their
defense efforts (IMPACT, 2009). Additionally, IMPACT maintains a research division, hosts
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educational workshops, and conducts high-level security briefings with representatives of
member states. These efforts are intended to make IMPACT the “the foremost cyber threat
resource centre in the world” (ITU, 2009c).
Although IMPACT has only been operational since March 2009, it is likely that the organ-
ization will become a significant provider of technical security data in the near future. If this
initiative is successful, an important precedent would be set for the proposition that an inter-
national organization can effectively perform a mission that lies beyond its initial cyber
mandate, build upon its core competencies, and extend its regulatory domain in response to tech-
nological innovations. Its efforts to promote cyber security arose as a function of the increasing
threat rather than as part of its original mission; thus, the international community chose to build
upon existing organizational strengths rather than establishing a new institution.
5.4 North Atlantic Treaty Organization
A major adaptive initiative has been demonstrated by North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) in a way roughly similar to IMPACT. Given the dramatic demonstration of cyber
attacks against Estonia (an NATO member), this intergovernmental organization established a
technical response arm in the aftermath of the coordinated attacks on Estonia in 2007. Desig-
nated the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE, 2009), this entity is
responsible for training NATO member states, conducting attack exercises, and supporting
NATO in the event of an international cyber attack. Interestingly, not all NATO states have
joined the CCDCOE program, with many countries opting to rely on their own traditional mili-
tary cyber defense networks. There is no strong evidence that all members of NATO are willing
to engage in a common approach to a shared problem, presumably because many states are
developing their own strategies for cyber warfare. At the same time, however, the CCDCOE
fills an important void for several European states, notably those whose own cyber security capa-
bilities are yet to be developed.
5.5 European Network and Information Security Agency
All things considered, it is fair to conclude that the overall European technical response to cyber
threats and cyber security has been somewhat limited in scope. Although the European Union
has published numerous resolutions on cybercrime, and the European Police Office
(EUROPOL) is actively engaged in investigation, the European Union’s only substantive
action thus far has been the creation of the European Network and Information Security
Agency (ENISA). Tasked with a broad mandate “to enhance the capability of the European
Union . . . to prevent, address and respond to network and information security problems,”
ENISA largely focuses on awareness building, promoting Internet safety practices, and
working with regional CERTs, and does not provide a comprehensive defense against regional
cyber incidents (Europa, 2009).
5.6 Convention on Cybercrime
One area in which European organizations have taken the lead is within the legislative realm. In
partnership with the USA, Japan, and others, the Council of Europe ratified the Convention on
Cybercrime in 2004, which remains the only binding international legislation dealing with the
cybercrime issue (Council of Europe, 2009a). As of September 2009, 26 countries have ratified
the treaty, and an additional 20 countries have signed but not yet ratified (Council of Europe,
2009b). The Convention defines the criminality of cyber crime, enables law enforcement
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agencies to effectively investigate electronic crimes, and fosters international cooperation and
data sharing (Council of Europe, 2001).
In support of the Convention, the Council of Europe implemented two distinct action plans
aimed at training law enforcement agencies and improving national legislation; it has hosted
global conferences on cybercrime issues annually (Council of Europe, 2009c). Additionally,
the Council of Europe maintains an extensive database on the progress of national cybercrime
legislation (Council of Europe, 2009d). This growth in function is important as it provides evi-
dence of institutionalized response and a broad framework necessary to effectively combat inter-
national cyber crime. However, it remains unclear whether the provisions of the Convention will
be able to keep pace with the rapid development of the domain; international legislation is often
reactive and generally lags behind technological efforts. The true value of the Convention may
thus lie in its capacity to “jump-start” national cyber crime legislation via its provision of an
adaptive legal framework.
5.7 Data provision
In this vein, many organizations provide valuable qualitative data, but few provide the quanti-
tative statistics required for robust analysis. As a result, it is difficult to objectively determine
the overall performance of these organizations.
This analytical gap may gradually close as organizations move from a passive posture to an
active and fully engaged role within the security landscape, as is evident with the establishment
of IMPACT and CCDCOE. Until then, the data provided by intergovernmental organizations
can be most effectively used to trace the enactment of legislation, standards, and policies
across member states. Utilizing stock-taking databases and ratification systems, it should be
possible to determine which countries or regions are on the leading edge of enacting the necess-
ary institutional frameworks to properly combat cyber crime.
Finally, it is important to stress that institutionalized data collection activities are always
undertaken within a mission framework. In other words, collection of data is driven by the
overall self-defined objectives and priorities of each organization. This is one of the major
sources of non-comparability across data sets. So far, at least, we have not yet seen efforts to
standardize definitions, collection procedures, or reporting mechanisms. In one sense, this is
not an unexpected development, as information standardization usually takes place only after
widespread data provision and demand.
6. National responses to security threats and cyber crime
Overall, theoretical approaches to institutions at the international level (generally addressed by
scholars in the field of international relations) are based on historical and conceptual foundations
different from those of institutional analysis at the national level (generally addressed by scho-
lars in the field of comparative politics). While there are some common concerns and shared pre-
sumptions, the overall motivations, assumptions, and perspectives on the underlying problems
differ considerably. Here, we do not need to explore the different epistemologies in any
detail, suffice to note that in the most general terms, institutions in all contexts and at all
levels of analysis are considered fundamental mechanisms of collective actions and that, at
the very minimum, they reduce transaction costs, facilitate the provision of pubic goods, and
enable the pursuit of social goals.
These core theoretical features are relevant to all institutional activities in response to cyber
threats and cyber attacks; however, the theoretical foundations for understanding institutional
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responses at the national level are based on domestic imperatives with little attention, if any, to
international considerations (we shall return to this issue later on).
6.1 Leading role
The USA has been at the forefront of institutional response to the new realities formed by cyber-
space. It is the leading world power, the state that originally encouraged and supported the cre-
ation of cyberspace, and the country that remains renowned for its innovative spirit. By default,
the USA has been thrust in a leadership position and has acted as a model for other governmental
response to cyber issues, notably in Europe and Asia. But, while the USA possesses arguably the
strongest known national safeguards against various cyber threats, these programs appear to be
far from sufficient. Indeed, according to a policy review, “it is doubtful that the United States can
protect itself from the growing threat” by maintaining its current security structure (The White
House, 2009a). The review continues:
The Federal government is not organized to address this growing problem effectively now or in the
future. Responsibilities for cybersecurity are distributed across a wide array of Federal departments
and agencies, many with overlapping authorities, and none with sufficient decision authority to direct
actions.
In order to trace the foundations of this institutional condition, we must turn to the early
federal efforts to combat cyber vulnerabilities. The government initially delegated civilian
network defense to the private sector or federally funded organizations such as CERT/CC. In
parallel, the intelligence and military communities developed and maintained closeted
defense systems. Although the relative technological advantage that these organizations pos-
sessed initially allowed them to maintain superiority over external threats, the lack of data
sharing and cooperation among agencies, coupled with a rise in global technical competence,
led to a growing security dilemma.
After the events of 2001, the USA began a substantial revision of its Internet security policy.
Through a series of Presidential Directives, the nascent Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) was granted responsibility for cyber Internet security efforts. These aims were codified
in The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (2003), which led to a dual approach to cyber
defense. With the cooperation of CERT/CC, a national CERT (US-CERT) was established
within the National Cyber Security Division of the DHS and was tasked with defending
federal civil networks (.gov domains). In order to coordinate the actions of various federal
agencies, DHS was asked to develop contingency plans and warning systems, and was
granted the ability to coordinate the efforts of 19 federal agencies in the event of a cyber
attack of national significance (The White House, 2003). Notably, however, the document
stressed that “the private sector is best equipped and structured to respond to an evolving
cyber threat,” and clearly delineated a separate approach for the “national security community”
(The White House, 2003).
As a result, DHS assumed responsibility for a previously neglected area of defense (federal
civil networks), but the compartmentalization of Internet defense strategies continued
unchecked. However, it is important to note that this compartmentalization may be a normal
byproduct of organizational and bureaucratic politics. As any legal scholar would be quick to
point out, this segmentation is not an arbitrary development, rather it is supported by a legal fra-
mework delineating the discrete assignment of responsibilities.
The critical issue here is not that barriers to communication and information sharing – result-
ing from legal segmentation – create added constraints on rapid response to cyber threats. This
situation is well appreciated by most, if not all, parts of the bureaucracy. Periodic restructuring
initiatives have consolidated the security arena; however, these changes remain marginal given
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the scale and scope of cyberspace and the associated threat potential. Nevertheless, the US gov-
ernment appeared committed to discovering valid alternatives, and there are several efforts
underway that may result in an effective response structure.
6.2 Emergent efforts
US cyber policy was further refined in 2008, when President Bush signed a presidential direc-
tive establishing the CNCI, or the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative. The
initiative includes several major policy revisions. First, in conjunction with the Office of Man-
agement and Budget, the DHS was tasked with reducing the number of network connections
between federal agencies and external providers from 4000 to 50 within four months (Samson,
2008). Second, an optional DHS program that monitored traffic to and from federal websites,
codenamed EINSTEIN, was transferred to the authority of the National Security Agency. The
new version of the program purportedly captures content as well as traffic, and proactively
monitors federal, and possibly private, networks (Samson, 2008). Lastly, the CNCI includes
several provisions that are aimed at increasing R&D, coordinating cyber counterintelligence,
and promoting information sharing among government organizations (The White House,
2009b).
Upon assuming office, President Obama endorsed the CNCI plan, albeit under conditions of
increased transparency. Additionally, the White House authorized a sweeping review of cyber
policy. Recognizing the increasing compartmentalization of national cyber defense, the final
report recommended establishing a cyber security office within the White House. Leading
this office, an official (referred to as the Cyber Czar by the press) would be a member of the
National Security Council and would have frequent access to the President.7 The office would
not possess the authority to make policy unilaterally, but it would coordinate the responses of
federal departments and attempt to bridge communication and policy gaps by
“recommend[ing] coherent unified policy guidance where necessary in order to clarify authorities,
roles, and responsibilities for cybersecurity-related activities across the Federal government” (The
White House, 2009a).
Recognizing that “federal responses to cyber incidents have not been unified,” the review
recommended eliminating overlapping responsibilities between agencies and defining specific
roles for cyber defense across government networks (The White House, 2009b).
These recommendations are still in the process of being implemented. However, consider-
able strides have been made in providing a coherent logic and rationale for the overall organiz-
ational response system. The proposed structure is presented in Figure 3.
The transition from an organic, overlapping defense network to organized hierarchies can
best be observed as a recurring pattern within the cyber security landscape. However, while
centralization and coordination is necessary in order to effectively respond to rapidly evol-
ving threats, inefficient organizational structures may confound the problem by reinforcing
barriers to bureaucratic adaptation. While few governments are as large and complex as
that of the USA, the fact remains that US cyber policies and the mechanisms for their
implementation provide important signals to other governments. Even if the US response
does not serve as a formal model, its institutional responses will be closely scrutinized by
others.
6.3 Cyber crime
The USA is a signatory to the Convention on Cyber Crime, with reservations. An important case
of organizational restructuring in response to cyber threats is illustrated by its own responses to
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the threats of 2001, when the FBI collaborated with the National White Collar Crime Center to
form the IC3. Sharing some structural similarities with INTERPOL’s 24/7 network, IC3 was
created to provide a central contact point for reporting Internet crimes. The program is still
active today, and by most accounts, has been a success. In 2008 alone, the IC3 processed
over 275,000 complaints, 26% of which were deemed valid and referred to law enforcement
agencies (National White Collar Crime Center, 2008). However, while the organization
serves as a successful model for a national reporting system, this model has been unable to con-
strain the growth of cyber crime. FBI surveys have shown that most Internet crime remains unre-
ported, and only a fraction of total cyber incidents are processed by the IC3. Furthermore,
although the estimated dollar loss of cybercrime has increased every year since 2005, referrals
have decreased substantially during the same period (National White Collar Crime Center,
2008).
In some sense, the lack of dramatic success thus far is unsurprising. Efforts to halt the spread
of cyber crime suffer from a number of inherent challenges. First, in contrast with traditional
crime, the criminality of cyber activities remains ill-defined. Many individuals are not accus-
tomed to reporting cyber crime to law enforcement organizations because issues may be
deemed “minor” or purely technical in nature, or because events on the Internet are deemed
outside the jurisdiction of a local police agency. This issue is present in the corporate sphere
as well, as many companies view the public acknowledgement of security vulnerabilities as a
Figure 3. Proposed US structure.
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corporate liability. Second, even when crimes are reported, investigation and prosecution
remains difficult. Evidence is often ephemeral and transitory, and the global nature of cyber
crime presents serious difficulties in pinpointing the location and identity of criminals. Lastly,
it often proves difficult to assess the true monetary damage of cyber crime, for instance, in
the case of information theft or security breach. Given that law enforcement agencies possess
limited resources, this ambiguity surrounding the true impact of cyber crime creates difficulties
in setting investigative priorities.
Although many of the efforts of the FBI and the Department of Justice (DOJ) have focused
on combating cyber crime at the national level, some initiatives have attempted to ameliorate
some of the aforementioned problems by embedding cyber crime experts in local institutions.
For instance, since 2003 the FBI has established collaborative Computer Crime Task Forces,
which assist police agencies in investigating local cyber crimes. As of 2006, there are over 92
task forces spread throughout the USA (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2006). In a similar
vein, the DOJ has established Computer Hacking & Intellectual Property units in local
federal courts, which provide lawyers with the training to effectively understand and prosecute
cyber crime.
In recent years, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has also played an active role in pre-
venting the spread of cyber crime. This new area of focus was not specifically mandated, but
rather arose as a byproduct of efforts to expand the FTC’s role in consumer protection. Although
the FTC is not tasked with prosecuting or investigating criminal networks, the commission acts
by issuing formal complaints and restraining orders against Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
that are suspected of hosting or promoting illegal activity. These actions prevent ongoing
cyber crime activities, while prosecution efforts are underway. The FTC thus occupies a critical
role in cross-sector collaboration, as the organization possesses the legal authority to rapidly
respond to time-sensitive security alerts from NGOs, CERTs, and local government agencies.8
In many ways, the USA is simultaneously pursuing centralized and decentralized approaches
to combating cyber crime (Figure 3). Critical to the success of either approach is the establish-
ment of a national culture that understands, recognizes, and reports cyber crime. Although stat-
istics on the success of local efforts remain limited, it is important to recognize that initial
investments in the sector may not display immediate dividends, due to the necessities of prelimi-
nary education and training (Figure 4).
The ITU comparison of cyber security initiatives worldwide revealed a wide range of
approaches with different degrees of development (ITU, 2005). While the process of institutio-
nalizing responses to cyber threats is at an early stage, it is possible to discern possible emergent
trajectories via the use of (highly incomplete) quantitative data provided by national govern-
ments. It is unlikely that governments will publically release data related to national security
intrusions, and data relating to civilian criminal activities is only available for a select few
countries.
For example, in the USA, the DOJ maintains a partial database of high-profile cases and con-
victions, while the FBI regularly publishes IC3 and survey data on cyber crime trends.9 Simi-
larly, national governments in Korea, Japan, and Taiwan release comprehensive yearly
statistics on cyber crime investigations, prosecutions, arrests, and demographic data. Although
less directly available, statistics are also provided by countries such as the UK, Germany, and
France.
Unfortunately, however, many countries lack robust legislation dealing with cyber crime; as
a result, cyber crime is rarely reported as a distinct category within national police reports. Until
such time that additional countries ratify the Convention on Cybercrime – and governments
actively pursue its implementation – it is probable that cybercrime data will not become
more widely available.
20 N. Choucri et al.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [S
tua
rt 
M
ad
nic
k]
 at
 07
:52
 23
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
3 
7. Some baseline conclusions
As presented above, the institutional cyber security landscape consists of a complex array of
organizations that exhibit significant diversity with regard to missions, mandates, interests,
opportunities, and constraints.
7.1 Characteristic features
On these bases, we put forth the following observations:
(a) The information technology-sustainable development linkage has become an integral
feature of the international community’s policy priorities.
(b) The current institutional landscape resembles a security patchwork that covers critical
areas rather than an umbrella that spans all of the known modes and sources of cyber
threat.
(c) Given the multiple contexts and diverse institutional motivations, we expect that
responses will be driven more by institutional imperatives and reactions to crisis than
by coordinated assessment and proactive response.
(d) Due to the complex global agenda at all levels of development, states may not be willing
to proceed until international norms are developed, rather they will “take matters in their
own hands” and develop first-order responses.
Figure 4. US investigation/prosecution organizations.
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(e) Cross-sector collaboration among public, private, and volunteer organizations may
serve as a temporary measure to cover holes in the current defense network.
However, at some point effective institutions will be necessary; they may develop in
parallel with rising public awareness.
(f) So far, we have not yet seen large terrorist groups engaged in intense cyber malfeasance.
This pattern cannot be expected to continue. Efforts to infiltrate critical US infrastruc-
ture and the devastating attacks on Estonia and Georgia in 2007 and 2008 underline the
dangers of being lulled into a false sense of security. As the Internet becomes increas-
ingly central to modern society, it is likely that criminals, terrorist groups, and other
opponents to state authority will target this sector in the hopes of disrupting critical
national functions. So far, the potential for significant threats is far greater than insti-
tutional capabilities to contain these threats. In other words, the “demand” for security
far exceeds the provision of effective “supply.”
7.2 Institutional anchors for cyber security
Such features notwithstanding, based on the evidence to date, we suggest that considerable strides
have been made to establish foundations for collaborative responses. In the best of all possible
worlds, we would expect to see the emergence of a collaborative framework – a large umbrella
network – allowing autonomous organizations to flexibly adapt to emerging threats in a coordi-
nated manner and increasing the impetus for information sharing in the realm of cyber security.
While the potential for such an umbrella network has yet to be realized, we can now point to
some institutional anchors that could support, or even consolidate, such a development:
(a) The establishment of not-for-profit institutions designed to focus on cyber threats
(CERT/CC, FIRST, and private CERTs), however “disorganized,” is a growing trend
on the international landscape. In some instances, these institutions have transitioned
to private–public partnerships.
(b) A number of international institutions established to manage interactions among
advanced states (notably supported by the OECD) reinforce rather than undermine
this development.
(c) International conferences designed to communicate the potential for information tech-
nology to facilitate transitions toward sustainable development (WSIS), while not cen-
tered on security issues, nonetheless have the advantage of large-scale private and public
participation, thus raising the political profile of cyber issues globally.
(d) The functional international organizations with core missions and competencies
(notably the ITU) have adopted security as part of their missions.
(e) Despite these seemingly complex and uncoordinated responses at the national level,
specific agencies are more and more tasked with responding to cyber crime (notably
the FBI in the USA).
(f) The development of binding international legislation (i.e. the Convention on Cyber-
crime) elevates the sense of vulnerability as well as the need to coordinate responses
to a higher level of awareness than ever before.
(g) In the field of military security framed more formally, we observe the salience of organ-
izations and strategies focused on the defense of military and intelligence networks (i.e.
CCDOE, CNCI).
Each of these institutional responses reflects mandates, rules, and responsibilities. None are
accorded complete regulatory power. Indeed, there is little evidence of overarching institutional
coordination or routinization. On the one hand, this pattern represents a certain degree of
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disconnect. On the other, it can be seen as a dynamic and shifting response to dynamic set of
cyber threats. In the latter context, one could argue that the increasingly dense landscape of insti-
tutional responses is an excellent indication that the international community is taking serious
steps to control a cyber threat of epidemic proportions.
In this connection, we can expect that, over time, we will see more and more forms of lateral
intergovernmental cooperation with the requisite institutional cross-border institutional collab-
oration. The theoretical foundations for such developments are accommodated by the structure
of the process of transnational activities as framed by Nye and Keohane (1977) and the exten-
sions in transnational governance outlined by Slaughter (2004) in the context of globalization
processes.
7.3 Critical missing piece
Although the current system of institutional arrangements shows signs of weakness, it is also true
that the level of organization and cooperation has been steadily increasing. Missing from these
international institutional developments (and thus from the above analysis) is a critical piece of
institutional architecture to support a fundamental function, namely systematic consideration for
data issues and matters of data provision and alignment. To some degree, the effectiveness of
this effort can be quantified through the use of statistics.
While a relatively small number of organizations produce reliable data, sufficient infor-
mation exists to develop a model that maps degree of vulnerability versus the effectiveness of
organizational response. For instance, international data on cyber crime legislation and aware-
ness can be correlated with arrest rates in individual countries. When combined with stock-
taking databases, this method allows one to determine the rate of progress in individual
nations versus cybercrime issues. Similarly, quantitative data provided by national CERTs
can be used to obtain insights about their performance in their respective national contexts
and constituencies. An example of these kinds of analysis, along with a Data Dashboard tool,
can be found in the report (Madnick, Li, et al., 2009).
Over time, we anticipate the possibility of pairing international and national statistics with
information from the private sector. Security and monitoring companies such as Symantec,
Arbor Networks, Microsoft, and McAfee provide quantitative data that address the global
spread of Internet vulnerabilities. In many cases, the volume and quality of data released by
these organizations far outpaces the information released by international and national organiz-
ations; however, the true value of this information lies not in an isolated analysis, but in the inter-
section of private data with the national and international sphere. For instance, statistics
concerning the originating country of cyber attacks or the absolute volume of attacks can poten-
tially be paired with national CERT data to determine the degree of national vulnerabilities and
traffic that each CERT is capable of handling.
These metrics, and others that can potentially be derived, may provide a powerful method of
simultaneously evaluating data quality and organizational performance. An important next step
in our inquiry is to examine additional data providers and explore ways of pairing this data with
national and international organizations to form evaluative statistical models. While doing so, it
is important to remain cognizant of the institutional context that enables or constrains the pro-
vision of information.
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Notes
1. See, for example, Goodrich, (1947), Claude (1967), and Hoffmann (1987).
2. See, for example, Mitrany (1948).
3. Haas (1961) is a good example.
4. See Keohane (1983) as an example. The concept of regime emerged as an important anchor in the field.
5. These organizations are also referred to as Computer Security Incident Response Teams (CSIRTs).
6. Unfortunately, CERT/CC has announced that no statistics will be published after Q3 2008. As a result,
analysis is limited to historical applications (1988–2008).
7. Note that the position has been established and is currently filled by Michael Daniel.
8. These are all examples of institutional developments in response to cyber security threats.
9. Note, however, that the USA does not currently provide any comprehensive statistics on arrests or
prosecutions.
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